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In the nineteenth century, states 
became larger. Italy and Germany were 
unified. The British and French empires 
reached their zenith. The United States 
of America fulfilled its manifest destiny 
by expanding from sea to shining sea 
and fought a bloody civil war to remain a 
single entity.
In the twentieth century, states became 
smaller. The century began with the 
collapse of the weakest and most 
decayed empires, Turkey and Austria-
Hungary, and ended with the collapse 
of the last great empire, that of Russia. 
In the second half of the century, the 
membership of the United Nations grew 
from fifty to two hundred. A majority of 
the current members of the European 
Union are countries that have only 
recently become independent states.
Economics, and economic mis-
understandings, provide much of the 
explanation of these stylised facts. 
The primary motive of the nineteenth 
century growth in the size of states was 
the belief that economic prosperity was 
founded on securing political control over 
natural resources. That belief was largely 
mistaken. Those who held it massively 
overestimated the importance of 
resources in economic development, and 
failed to recognise that market access 
was not inevitably bound up with political 
union. Nor did they appreciate that the 
military costs of securing resources, and 
maintaining control over the associated 
territory without the consent of the 
local population, would come greatly to 
exceed any economic benefits.
The twentieth century would give 
small states the opportunity to achieve 
prosperity on the basis of narrow 
specialisation in a global economy. Such 
states would also benefit from the greater 
capacity of homogenous communities to 
reconcile economic dynamism with social 
cohesion. As a result, some small states 
in Western Europe would, in the course 
of the twentieth century, move from 
being among the poorest countries in the 
world to be among the richest.
Most people account for the political 
events I have described through the rise, 
and fall, of different kinds of nationalism. 
Nationalism is a complex mixture of 
ethnic and cultural affinities, rooted in 
a shared, and often largely apocryphal, 
history1. But while individuals have a 
need for group identities, the identities 
they emphasise change. The Scots have 
been British when it suited them, and 
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Scottish when it suited them. In the 
nineteenth century, Scots as Britons 
gained access to the English empire and 
the apparently necessary protection of 
a great military power. Today, Scots no 
longer perceive these advantages and 
are, once again, primarily Scots.
Economic forces were conducive to 
political integration in the nineteenth 
century and favoured political 
fragmentation in the twentieth century. 
The principal sources of change were in the 
nature of government and government 
activities, which turned government 
from a fundamentally coercive activity 
into a deliverer of services many of which 
were best delivered locally; and changes 
in the global economic environment, 
which allowed trade blocs to replace 
empires and enabled small countries to 
compete globally on the basis of narrow 
competitive advantages.
The changing nature of government
Max Weber famously defined government 
as the body which sustains a monopoly 
of coercion within a defined geographical 
area2. The nature of nineteenth-century 
government followed that definition. 
Military expenditure was the largest 
component of government spending. 
Typically the next largest component was 
interest, which represented the costs of 
past wars.
This view of the nature of the state was 
associated with what Norman Angell 
(1913) would term ‘the Great Illusion’: 
the idea that nations could increase their 
prosperity by gaining resources through 
territorial conquest. That idea has a 
long history. And in a world of little or 
no economic growth, where the principal 
means of enhancing wealth was to steal 
it from someone else, there is much 
sense in that view.
The Industrial Revolution, which made 
economic growth possible, and the rise of 
democracy, which required that national 
wealth be widely shared, would transform 
that position, (although it would only 
change perceptions more slowly). Wealth 
creation within the framework of security 
of property and institutions would provide 
a larger and more enduring source of 
prosperity than grabbing land, resources 
or treasure. The Great Illusion would, at 
least for Europeans, be finally dispelled in 
the ruin of Europe in 1945, the collapse 
of overseas empires that followed – 
and in the rapid recovery of European 
economies from the destruction of their 
infrastructure. Conquest fails the modern 
test of cost benefit analysis and the 
dominant items in government budgets 
today are not war and its aftermath, but 
social security, education and health.
The internal dimension of coercive 
power was as important as the external. 
Nineteenth-century government imposed 
a social and political order of doubtful 
legitimacy by force. This structure 
was, in Europe, overtaken by the rise 
of democracy. Modern government 
rules by general consent, or at least 
acquiescence, and cannot rule without 
it; an elected (and re-elected) British 
government could not successfully 
implement a poll tax. Internal coercion 
is applied, essentially, to a psychopathic 
minority.
In describing government in this way, I 
am describing modern Western Europe. 
Most of the rest of the world is closer to 
Weber’s description. There the state is 
usually a coercive agency deployed by, 
and largely in the interests of, a ruling 
group. The modern term ‘failed state’ – 
as in Afghanistan or Somalia - describes 
the absence of even a temporary 
monopoly of such coercion. Even in the 
United States, both the nature and the 
perception of government are different; 
a difference exemplified in the use of the 
phrases ‘war on terror’ and ‘war on drugs’. 
Both of these phrases ring uncomfortably 
in the ears of most Europeans, who are 
sensibly doubtful that either problem can 
be solved by the exercise of external or 
internal coercive power.
There are evident economies of scale 
in coercion. As a result, whether one is 
talking about legitimate governments 
or criminal gangs, there is a strong 
tendency towards monopoly in the 
exercise of coercive power. An economist 
would naturally classify the exercise of 
coercion as a natural monopoly. It is 
prudent to join the winning gang: and 
if the largest gang can use its power 
to gain more resources for itself, it can 
reinforce that power.
The natural monopoly did, in due course, 
come about at the global level. So we see 
a United States whose coercive power is 
many times that of any other country 
in the world, but gains little economic 
advantage from that power. The 
frustration engendered by possession of 
the most powerful military machine ever 
seen, superbly equipped to wage wars 
which it will never be asked to fight, is 
evident when that machine struggles to 
deal with the threats America actually 
perceives.
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But modern Europeans rarely want their 
governments to kick ass. Nor do they 
want to spend much on preparations 
for that activity. As a proportion of 
overall public spending, defence is well 
behind social security, education and 
health. What modern Europeans expect 
their government to do is to provide 
schools and hospitals, and to assure 
their physical and economic security. 
The notion of government as a hostile, 
coercive force, still widely encountered 
in the United States, has very little 
resonance in Western Europe.
European government is an economic 
agent, like a shop or a phone company. 
The ideological content is steadily draining 
from European politics: European leaders 
proclaim their competence rather than 
their convictions. As with the output 
of businesses, we judge government 
mainly by the quality of its output 
and the perceived competence of its 
management. And in general, we judge it 
less favourably than we judge business.
Changes in the global economic 
environment
These changes in the role of the state 
occurred, and were partly associated 
with, changes in the global economic 
environment. In the twentieth century, 
it became possible to build a prosperous 
economy based on speciality chemicals, 
precision engineering – even to build an 
economy based on fish. If, like Iceland, 
your principal product is fish, then as 
an autarchic state you are poor, but as 
a state in a global trading environment, 
you are rich. On this central truth of 
international economics have been built 
some of the greatest economic success 
stories of the twentieth century.
Set Iceland to one side for the moment – 
though there are many lessons, positive 
and negative, from Iceland’s recent and 
historic experience. But Switzerland and 
Finland, for example, were among the 
poorest countries in the world in the 
nineteenth century. In the twenty-first 
century, they are among the richest. 
Inhospitable terrain, adverse climate, 
absence of minerals, are no longer 
disadvantages. The resourcefulness 
that such unfavourable physical factors 
engendered is a positive boon.
The key development making such growth 
possible has been the dissociation of 
trading alliances from military alliances. 
So long as the belief that prosperity 
depended on control over resources 
was prevalent, such an association 
was inevitable. In any conflict self-
sufficiency in resources and industries 
was indispensable. A war-going nation 
needed to be self-sufficient in resources, 
food and industrial capacity.
Small states could not efficiently achieve 
such self-sufficiency. You cannot fight 
a war with fish or whatever other 
product provides you with comparative 
advantage. But in the modern world, 
you cannot fight a war over fish either; 
the comparative advantage cannot be 
appropriated by a bully. Although the 
coercive power of the United Kingdom 
was many times that of Iceland, during 
the Cod Wars there was no practical 
means of exercising that power. That 
illustrated again the complex relationship 
between economic power and coercive 
force.
Military power does not imply prosperity, 
or vice versa, and it is difficult to give 
intelligible meaning to the concept of 
national economic power. When the 
European Union is described as a free 
trade zone of 300m people, I understand 
the significance of what is said; when 
people who describe it add together the 
gross domestic products of the member 
states to talk admiringly about the size 
of the European economy, I am not sure 
what significance to attach to the answer. 
Certainly there is no relationship between 
size of state and per capita income.
The prosperity of small states is a 
direct consequence of globalisation. 
Finland and Switzerland manufacture 
no cars, though they consume many. 
They do make textiles, but as high end 
speciality products for a world market. 
The automobile industry itself, the poster 
child of globalisation, is a surprising 
refutation of the common thesis that 
globalisation benefits the big battalions 
(the phrase itself is a reminder of how 
common is the mistaken use of military 
analogy).
In the 1960s, the three largest car 
manufacturers had more than half the 
world car market: today they have less 
than a third. The share of the largest 
ten producers once 85%, is now less 
than 75%. However it is measured, 
concentration in the global automobile 
industry has steadily decreased since 
the market became global. The big 
beneficiaries from globalisation have not 
been GM and Ford, whose market shares 
have fallen considerably, but companies 
like Hyundai and BMW, which have been 
able to develop market niches on a world 
scale and have, in consequence, become 
major producers.
In the modern global economic 
environment, economic success depends 
not on scale but competitive advantage. 
Such competitive advantage may be held 
by individual firms – like Disney or Coca-
Cola. More commonly, groups of related 
firms exploit local competitive advantages 
– southern Germany’s strengths in 
precision engineering, Korea’s high 
quality low cost production work force. 
The general lesson for small states from 
the success of small countries, notably 
in Europe, is the opportunity to develop 
growth and prosperity on the basis of 
quite narrow sources of competitive 
advantage.
Lessons for the UK devolution 
agenda
Our demands are increasingly for 
services rather than for goods and 
differentiated products tailored to our 
individual needs. This is why firms like 
BMW have prospered, and in the richest 
economies such niche firms have won 
sales from global volume producers. 
The global success of these focused 
firms is a reminder that niche does not 
necessarily mean local. But it frequently 
does, especially in services. Services, 
to repeat, are what we now seek from 
government; welfare, health, education 
followed by defence, transport, internal 
security, and environmental services.
With privately produced goods and 
services, of course, the organisation of 
production adapts to the nature of the 
market. Boeing and Airbus assemble 
aeroplanes for the world from single 
facilities at Seattle and Toulouse: haircuts 
are, and always will be, locally produced 
and delivered. The adaptation of the 
location of production to the needs of 
the customer is equally relevant to public 
consumption. The level of organisation 
appropriate for elementary education 
is lower than the level of organisation 
appropriate for higher education; most 
environmental issues are best dealt with 
at very local levels, but some at very 
aggregate levels; and so on.
That matching of service delivery to 
efficient scale changes what we mean 
by sovereignty. Weber’s definition 
emphasised the coercive role of 
the state: along with coercion went 
monopoly. But if coercion is no longer the 
defining characteristic of state action, 
the requirement of monopoly falls away 
also. We can envisage multiple layers of 
government operating within a single 
local area, each delivering the services 
in which they have a competitive 
advantage. And that is what, increasingly, 
we observe.
The context set by the EU is thus a 
key part of the UK’s devolution debate. 
The EU is a layer of government which 
appropriately wields authority on issues 
for which the appropriate level is the 
European. There are not many such 
issues, but internal and external trade 
policy are at or near the top of the list. 
That view of the EU sees it for what it 
is – a bureaucracy with limited, well 
defined functions. Not everyone wants 
to think that way: officials and politicians 
who operate at the EU level naturally 
try to seize what powers they can from 
other levels of government, with modest 
success. They often seek to create the 
appearance of a traditional Weberian 
state at European level. That means 
European involvement, and ultimately 
control, of internal security, foreign and 
defence policies. These advocates make 
little progress in these areas, and are 
likely to continue to make little progress.
But in Philip Bobbitt’s words, ‘it is a failure 
of imagination, however, to assume 
that the only thing that will replace the 
nation-state is another structure with 
nation-state like characteristics. It is 
in some ways rather pathetic that the 
visionaries in Brussels imagine nothing 
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more forward-looking than the equipping 
of the EU with the trappings of the nation 
state’ (Bobbitt, 2002). Seen from this 
perspective, the arguments both of 
those who would like Britain to wrest 
sovereignty back from the EU and those 
who would like Scotland to reassert 
sovereignty against the UK are missing 
the point. They cling to a concept of the 
nature of government that is no longer 
relevant.
Trade policy needs to be handled at high 
level. And so does monetary policy. In an 
era of global finance small states need to 
be part of a trade bloc and an actual or 
de facto monetary union. Education and 
health are necessarily delivered locally, 
while defence and borrowing benefit 
from economies of scale. Transport, 
energy and environmental issues all 
have aspects on small and grand scales.
Industrial and business policies provide 
the most complex case. Economic 
competition between European states, 
and by European states in the global 
economy is no longer about the capacity to 
mobilise divisions and dreadnoughts, but 
about the capacity to acquire economic 
rents by selling mobile phones and 
speciality chemicals. Economic success is 
not achieved by armies on broad fronts, 
but predicated on the development of 
relatively narrow competitive advantages 
in firms and groups of firms.
In this modern competition, some of 
the major winners have been small 
states whose economies have been able 
to pursue their strengths without the 
paralysis created by conflict between 
large, established vested interests: 
the paralysis the Thatcher government 
partially destroyed in the UK but is so 
evidently persistent in Europe’s other 
large economies in France, Germany 
and Italy. On the other hand, the crony 
capitalism that is easily characteristic 
of an economy with a small elite which 
controls both politics and business - 
the problem so evident in the financial 
collapses in Ireland and Iceland - is 
an equally evident danger. Large and 
small states are both vulnerable to rent 
seeking, but in different ways.
Tax and welfare
Tax and welfare are everywhere among 
the most contentious issues in devolution. 
The experience of governments 
everywhere is that the levels at which 
it is most efficient to collect taxes are 
higher, on average, than the levels 
at which it is most efficient to make 
expenditure decisions. Even for large 
states, jurisdictional and enforcement 
problems for corporation tax and the 
taxation of income from capital are 
becoming increasingly severe. The 
mismatch between efficient tax raising 
and efficient expenditure allocation is 
why federal states generally have a 
system of distribution from central to 
state or provincial governments.
The proposed devolution of tax powers to 
Scotland is the most significant outcome 
of the negotiations that followed the 
September 2014 referendum. The 1997 
settlement gave Scotland (and Wales) 
negligible authority over either revenue 
or overall fiscal balance. The plans 
now in the course of implementation 
would raise the proportion of Scottish 
government expenditure (currently 
around £40bn) which is raised in Scotland 
to approximately 60%, although a 
substantial part is the assignment to 
Scotland of a pro rata share of UK VAT 
revenue.
The most significant area of new devolved 
authority is control over rates (though 
not structure) of income tax. This gives 
only limited real freedom to the Scottish 
government. Both major parties in 
Scotland are likely to want to spend 
more and to do so in a more progressive 
manner. But each of the following would 
have an impact of around £500m (a little 
more than 1% of Scottish government 
expenditure) on revenues:
 • one point on basic (20%) rate
 • five points on higher (40%) rate
 • lowering the higher rate threshold by 
    £10,000
 • a zero rate on the first £1000 of  
    taxable income3
Reversing the reduction in the additional 
rate from 50% to 45% (the additional 
rate is paid by around 15,000 people who 
currently report a principal residence in 
Scotland) would probably generate no 
extra revenue at all; only 1,000 of these 
additional rate taxpayers would have to 
discover that they were now resident in 
England to eliminate any revenue gain.
A draconian package which added five 
points to every rate and reduced the 
income level at which higher rate tax 
became payable to £30,000 (median 
earnings in Scotland are around 
£27,000,4 broadly similar to the UK 
figure) would raise Scottish government 
revenue by less than 10% of its current 
expenditure, less than the amount by 
which per capita spending in Scotland 
currently exceeds that of the UK.
It is perhaps not too much of an 
exaggeration to say that the degree 
of commonality of welfare provision 
may now in advanced countries have 
replaced the monopoly of coercion as 
the defining characteristic of a state. 
States provide internal redistribution 
and mutual insurance between different 
regions, though the principles of such 
redistribution, and the extent to which 
such redistribution is between devolved 
governments or to individuals varies 
widely. The welfare systems of smaller 
countries have exploited the greater 
sense of solidarity in smaller communities 
to provide economic security without 
creating the substantial excluded 
minorities which are characteristic of 
Europe’s larger economies, especially 
France and the UK.
It is no accident that cross border 
welfare provision is the most contentious 
element in Britain’s current pre-
referendum negotiation with the EU. 
The planned revision of allocation of 
powers gives some, but very limited, 
discretion over welfare provision to the 
Scottish government. The scope for 
resentment within the United Kingdom 
if Scottish benefits differ materially - in 
either direction - from those operating 
elsewhere is obvious.
The distribution of UK-raised tax 
revenues, and the differentiation 
of welfare provision, are the most 
predictable elements of future dissension 
between Scotland and the UK as a whole 
in the immediate future. It is all about 
the money. The White Paper published 
by the SNP government ahead of the 
referendum, listing the policies which 
would be pursued in an independent 
Scotland5, contains a lengthy wish list; 
a large majority are things which the 
Scottish government currently has the 
power, but not the money, to do. It 
follows that no degree of devolution 
could satisfy the demands made or 
expectations created.
Economics is the driver and the 
nationalist sentiment follows. These 
economic origins distinguish today’s 
debates about devolution, statehood and 
sovereignty from those that dominated 
post-Westphalian Europe.
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Notes
1. Scotland is an interesting case study for competing theories of nationalism. The position taken here is closer to the ethno-
nationalism of Smith (1998, 2000) and Tamir (1993) than the account of Gellner (1983, 1997) which continues to stress the 
equation of state and nation.
2. In his 1919 lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’.
3. Author’s estimates based on HMRC statistics; https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/income-tax-statistics-and-distributions
4. See http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0044/00441139.pdf
5. See www.gov.scot/resource/0043/00439021.pdf
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